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I. INTRODUCTION 
I hope that the Supreme Court will ultimately define 
Crawford’s1 testimonial concept in a way that is neither formal 
nor formalistic,2 giving it a reasonably broad scope that covers 
most accusatory statements in non-confidential settings.3  If my 
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 1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 By formal, I refer to the requirements of written or recorded medium for 
the statement, which is at the heart of the definition proposed by Justices Thomas and 
Scalia in White v. Illinois. 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). If the 
statement defines its testimonial quality, the coverage of the Confrontation Clause is 
subject to easy manipulation by the police by avoiding such formality. By formalistic, I 
mean wooden adherence to a set formula rather than a functional approach based on 
the protective purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The most important feature is the 
core concern of whether certain witnesses were making criminal accusations against 
the defendant.  Beyond that, a rigid formula should not be imposed.  See generally 
Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic Definition – The Case for an 
“Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Summer 2005).  
 3 At the presentation of the papers for this Symposium, I made comments 
regarding two topics.  My first comments concerned “Testimonial Statements.”  I began 
by expressing trepidation that this critical term may ultimately be defined in an 
unfortunately narrow, formal, and formalistic fashion.  I quoted a conversation from 
the Vietnam war movie Platoon.  In a scene that precedes the final devastating enemy 
attack, “Red” O’Neill approaches his platoon leader, Bob Barnes, who is played by Tom 
Berringer.  Red asks Bob to allow him to leave on one of the last departing helicopters 
for R&R set to begin only a few days later.  After Bob turns him down because every 
available soldier is needed, Red pleads for reconsideration: “I got a bad feeling on this 
one, all right?. . . I mean I got a bad feeling!”  PLATOON (Orion Pictures 1986). 
  Red’s plea was not granted, and his bad feeling was accurate.  He did not 
survive the night.  I hope that by contrast my fear is misguided. 
  My major substantive point here is that the definition would be better if it 
focused on “accusatory” statements rather than “testimonial” ones and that it would be 
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hope is realized, the restrictions Crawford places on evidence 
will exclude much hearsay evidence that before Crawford was 
received in domestic violence cases, and it will have a 
somewhat lesser, but still important, impact on hearsay in 
child sexual abuse cases.4  However, as I have argued earlier,5 
widespread failures of prosecution are neither necessary nor 
inevitable even if the type of interpretation of Crawford that I 
advocate is adopted. 
In cases involving child sexual abuse, prosecutors before 
Crawford often depended on hearsay statements by children to 
police, other government investigators, and to specialized 
medical investigating teams.  Crawford, under my 
interpretation, will exclude many of these statements because 
they violate the confrontation rights of the defendant.  
However, as I describe in Part II, Crawford allows admission of 
such statements if the child testifies at trial and is subject to 
cross-examination, thus offering a method for prosecutors to 
ameliorate Crawford’s negative impact.  As I describe in Part 
III, in domestic violence cases, victims are often more willing to 
speak with authorities immediately after the violence than 
later when they are called to testify at trial.  Before the 
Crawford decision, prosecutors introduced hearsay statements 
made by victims to police and other government agents shortly 
after the violence.  Crawford, under my interpretation, will 
exclude many of those statements, but it allows admission of 
previously cross-examined statements of unavailable 
witnesses.  Thus, prosecutors may ameliorate the negative 
impact of Crawford in these cases by creating opportunities for 
victims to give cross-examined testimony close in time to the 
assault when they are frequently still cooperating with 
authorities. 
My contribution to this Symposium is chiefly about 
developing the further set of supporting doctrines that are 
  
improved if it at least explicitly included the accusatory concept. I have written about 
this basic argument in Mosteller, supra note 2, and I will not elaborate further here. 
 4 On the other hand, the impact on child sexual abuse cases is likely 
minimal if the definition of testimonial is narrow, formal, formalistic, and limited to 
close analogies to the types of statements specifically covered by Crawford – “prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial” and 
“police interrogations,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, also described as “structured police 
questioning.”  Id. at 53 n.4. 
 5 In Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation 
of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005), I argued that important hearsay evidence 
can continue to be received and criminals can be successfully prosecuted by providing 
more confrontation and thereby satisfying Crawford’s requirements.  
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necessary to ensure that actual confrontation occurs when 
hearsay is admitted under the exceptions to Crawford, which I 
suggest may be used to avoid much of its negative impact in 
cases involving children and domestic violence.  When the 
confrontation right is satisfied by a child taking the stand at 
the current trial, the right must be understood to require that 
the prosecution call the witness and attempt to elicit his or her 
accusation publicly.  The Confrontation Clause requires not 
only the right to cross-examine, but also, as the text itself 
indicates, the right to be confronted with the witness’ 
accusation.  Similarly, when the confrontation right is satisfied 
in domestic violence cases by prior confronted testimony of an 
unavailable witness, the right must be understood to require 
that the prosecution call the witness to make his or her 
accusation at that other proceeding.6 Moreover, the proceeding 
must have consequences to the government and/or benefits for 
the defendant.  The Clause is not satisfied by the prosecution 
simply making the witness available at a prior hearing or 
calling the witness to testify at a pretrial hearing that has no 
consequences other than to render the testimony admissible if 
the witness later becomes unavailable.  A contrary 
interpretation would potentially transform the defendant’s 
right to be confronted with witnesses at trial into the inferior 
and inadequate right to have witnesses made available at some 
point during the prosecution of the case. 
In Parts II and III, I briefly set out that the 
Confrontation Clause can be satisfied for prior statements of 
children by the prosecution calling the child to testify at trial, 
and for unavailable domestic violence victims by affording 
early opportunities for testimony subject to cross-examination.  
In Part IV, I develop two requirements that are interrelated in 
Confrontation Clause theory.  First, as to present testimony 
(often by children), the prosecution must call the witness and 
ask that witness to state her accusation in court.  Second, as to 
prior testimony by an unavailable witness (often in domestic 
violence cases), the prosecution must elicit the testimony in a 
proceeding where the defendant has not only the opportunity, 
but also the motive, to cross-examine.  In Part V, I discuss why 
it is important to carefully scrutinize the prosecution’s claim 
  
 6 In the rare situation where the defendant voluntarily called the witness at 
the earlier proceeding, the Clause is satisfied without more. In this situation, the 
public accusation occurred and the defendant was obviously motivated by some 
perceived benefit to call the witness.  
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that a witness is truly unavailable once confronted testimony is 
received.  Greater scrutiny is appropriate because the 
prosecution’s incentive to find and call the claimed unavailable 
witness is dramatically reduced once such testimony is secured. 
II. CONFRONTATION AT THE PRESENT TRIAL:  ASSISTING 
CHILDREN TO BE ABLE TO TAKE THE STAND 
I begin with child victims and witnesses in sexual abuse 
cases.  In these cases, Crawford can be satisfied most easily by 
the prosecution working diligently to prepare the child for 
examination and producing a willing and able child for 
testimony at trial.  If the child takes the stand, testifies against 
the defendant, and is subject to cross-examination, then there 
is no Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of prior 
hearsay statements by the child.  End of issue.  I call this way 
of satisfying Crawford the Green-Owens principle of present 
confrontation.7 
This mechanism gives the prosecution the incentive to 
succeed in preparing the child to testify.  This is a practical, 
safe, and ethical solution because the prosecution is the party 
that generally has access to the child and is best situated to 
help prepare the child for testimony.  Moreover, the 
prosecution is likely in the best position to actually produce the 
child.  This method of satisfying Crawford motivates the 
prosecution to make the child available rather than trying to 
admit hearsay after persuading the court that the child is 
unavailable or incapable of testifying.8 
I do not suggest this “solution” is costless.  It requires 
hard work by prosecutors, police, social workers, parents, and 
caregivers, and could cause the child to suffer emotional 
trauma.  However, I believe this solution works.  In situations 
where prosecutors have statutory incentives to call the child as 
  
 7 See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1988); California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1970). In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Confrontation Clause is met as to any prior statement by that witness if the witness 
takes the stand at the present trial, testifies, and is available for cross-examination. 
399 U.S. at 157-64.  In Owens, the Court made this method of meeting the 
Confrontation Clause easy to meet by ruling that a witness with serious memory loss 
was still “available” for cross-examination.  484 U.S. at 561-62. 
 8 States may want to change competency statutes and rules to permit 
constitutionally able children to testify and be cross-examined. 
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a witness, as they do for instance in Oregon,9 prosecutors tend 
to be successful in preparing the child for testimony. 
In these situations, the defense may end up complaining 
because cross-examination of children is difficult to conduct 
effectively.  The reality is that cross-examining children is 
challenging in any situation and some defense attorneys may 
not be up to the task.  However, the Confrontation Clause is 
still satisfied by an uninhibited opportunity to cross-examine, 
even if this requires a lawyer to exercise substantial skill, 
judgment, and sensitivity. 
III. PRIOR CONFRONTATION:  HAVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS TESTIFY AT EARLY ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS 
In domestic violence cases, the ameliorative analogue to 
the child victim testifying in sexual abuse cases is to provide 
opportunities for early confrontation, which Crawford 
recognizes as satisfying the Confrontation Clause for 
unavailable witnesses.10 I call this the past confrontation plus 
present unavailability principle.11 
Often in these cases, the victim is cooperative with the 
prosecution and more willing to testify immediately after the 
violence, but that cooperation and willingness diminish over 
time.  Thus, if the victim’s testimony could be received soon 
after the violent event, complete with an opportunity for cross-
examination, the victim’s testimony would likely be more 
forthcoming.  Further, that testimony would be admissible 
under Crawford if the witness later becomes unavailable. 
This mechanism for meeting Crawford has an 
additional benefit.  Frequently, perpetrators will, in one 
fashion or another, coerce their victims either not to appear at 
trial, or to be uncooperative or uncommunicative if they do 
appear at trial.  After confronted testimony has been given, 
however, the defendant loses much of the incentive to coerce or 
intimidate the victim into not appearing.  Indeed, with the 
  
 9 Oregon Evidence Rule 803(18a)(b) provides that all prior statements of a 
child in sexual abuse cases are admissible if the child testifies and is subject to cross-
examination.  OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b) (2005) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 
40.460(18a)(b) (2005)).  This rule creates a hearsay exception for children in sexual 
abuse cases that includes all statements admissible under the Green-Owens principle 
of present confrontation. 
 10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 57. 
 11 Professor Tom Lininger, who is part of the Symposium, has written about 
this option.  See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 
(2005). 
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confronted testimony “in the can” for use if the victim does not 
appear and testify, the defendant may have the positive 
incentive to have the victim appear and provide exculpatory 
testimony.  While that testimony may be false, presumably the 
trier of fact will generally be able to separate truth from lies 
given the obvious explanation for the change in story.  Thus, 
either prior confronted testimony will be admitted if the 
witness is unavailable, or live testimony will take its place, and 
the Green-Owens principle of present confrontation will allow 
admission of the prior statement.  In either case, more 
confrontation will lead to more admissible evidence. 
IV. THE INTER-RELATED REQUIREMENTS OF (1) 
AFFIRMATIVE TESTIMONY AT THE PRESENT TRIAL IN 
CHILDREN’S CASES AND (2) THE PROSECUTION ELICITING 
TESTIMONY AT A PRIOR HEARING WHERE THE 
DEFENDANT HAS BOTH OPPORTUNITY AND MOTIVE TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
Several courts, including State v. Snowden,12 have 
rejected the argument13 that under the Green-Owens principle 
simply having the declarant available to be called by the 
defendant at trial satisfies the Confrontation Clause.  These 
courts have gotten the point right.  However, sometimes they 
stated the argument in the negative – the defendant has no 
obligation to call a witness to make hearsay evidence 
admissible and thereby prove the state’s case,14 or that it is the 
state’s burden to make the testimony admissible.15  Snowden 
goes further by making the important positive argument, “In a 
criminal trial, the State is required to place the defendant’s 
accusers on the stand so that the defendant both may hear the 
accusations against him or her stated in open court and have 
the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses.”16 
In an earlier article, I detailed a more elaborate 
argument for this absolutely correct point.17  The proposition is 
supported by the wording of the Confrontation Clause itself, 
  
 12 867 A.2d 314, 332-33 (Md. 2005). 
 13 See also State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 931, 938-39 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Bratton v. 
State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 693-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). 
 14 Cox, 876 So. 2d at 938. 
 15 Bratton, 156 S.W.3d at 694. 
 16 Snowden, 867 A.2d at 332 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)). 
 17 See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 578-86. 
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which requires that the defendant be “confronted with” the 
witnesses against him, rather than merely having the right “to 
confront.”18  The proposition is stated in many of the Supreme 
Court’s articulations of the right and also in culturally 
important quotations about confrontation that the Court has 
cited.  All of these sources inform us that a defendant has a 
right to face the accuser as that person is making his or her 
accusation.19  Further, the proposition is supported by the 
historical writings available to the Framers, which contrasted 
the despised inquisitorial methods with the obvious benefits of 
the English common law method of proof, where witnesses 
testify orally in open court before the defendant.  Thus, 
witnesses made their accusations there and then as opposed to 
making them in private and having them recorded with the 
clear potential for government manipulation and distortion.20 
It is critical to recognize that the right of confrontation 
requires a public accusation.  This point has direct application 
to the way I interpret the Confrontation Clause and the way 
Crawford should be satisfied in child abuse cases.  As discussed 
below, it also has important implications for how to define and 
limit the right through prior testimony in an adversarial 
setting.  The Confrontation Clause may be satisfied as to a 
prior statement by what occurs at the present trial, or if the 
declarant is unavailable, by what occurred at a prior hearing.  
Importantly, in both situations, the right to be “confronted 
with” the witnesses against the defendant must be met.  This 
means that, first, the accuser must stand in the defendant’s 
presence and be called upon to make his or her accusation, and 
second, the defendant must have a chance to cross-examine.  
Both components are required.21 
A common situation at apparent odds with the right I 
have just described occurs when the accuser denies the 
accusation, but the Confrontation Clause is still held to be 
  
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 19 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016-19 (1988) (quoting numerous 
statements from various sources that provide not only cross-examination but the right 
to be faced with the accusation in the first instance); Dowdell v. United States, 221 
U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (noting the similarity between the Sixth Amendment right and a 
statute specifying that the accused is to be tried using only such “witnesses as meet 
him face to face at trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give the accused 
an opportunity of cross-examination”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 
(1895) (including both “personal examination and cross-examination”). 
 20 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373-74 (1783). 
 21 This is the unmistakable point of the quotations from Mattox, Dowdell, and 
Coy discussed supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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satisfied by the witness’ present “accusation” and cross-
examination.  Does that denial fail the test of accusation, and if 
it does not, how do I justify the result while maintaining my 
general point that accusation is required? 
I believe there is no requirement in the Confrontation 
Clause that, when standing before the defendant and asked by 
the prosecution to make the accusation, the accuser must in 
fact incriminate the defendant.  I will use the well-known 
example – actually the counterfactual example – of Sir Walter 
Raleigh to illustrate this point. 
The basic facts of the Raleigh story are generally well 
known in circles familiar with the Confrontation Clause 
debate.  The part of the story I am referring to, stated in brief, 
involves Lord Cobham’s accusations to the Privy Council 
implicating Raleigh in a plot to overthrow the crown.  These 
were received in “testimonial” form in Raleigh’s trial.  Raleigh 
repeatedly complained during that trial that Cobham should be 
brought before him to make his accusations, believing, as 
Cobham had previously communicated to Raleigh by letter, 
that he would publicly recant those accusations.22 
My assumption is that had Cobham been produced by 
those trying Raleigh, the sense of justice of his contemporaries, 
the Framers, and modern observers would have been satisfied, 
at least as a matter of confrontation.  This would have 
remained true even if Cobham had said in his testimony that 
none of his prior statements were true, and Raleigh’s judges 
had nevertheless relied on Cobham’s earlier statements to 
convict.  That certainly was the position of the Supreme Court 
in California v. Green.23 
The Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to 
call the witness on direct, so that in most cases the accusation 
will be presented directly to the defendant’s face.  In those 
cases where the witness repudiates her accusation, that denial 
has a practical and a constitutionally significant impact: it is 
  
 22 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 157, 157 n.10 (1970); 30 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6342, at 
258-69 (1997).  It should be noted that Cobham had also written to the prosecutors that 
his recantation was false and had been provided because Raleigh requested it.  1 DAVID 
JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 444-46 (1832). 
 23 The Court in Green stated: “So far as appears, in claiming confrontation 
rights no objection was made against receiving a witness’ out-of-court depositions or 
statements, so long as the witness was present at trial to repeat his story and to 
explain or repudiate any conflicting prior stories before the trier of fact.”  399 U.S. at 
157 (emphasis added). 
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made in open court and in the presence of the jury, without any 
filter by the prosecution, and it tends to damage the 
prosecution’s case.  Thus, the defendant either is confronted 
with the accusation, or, as Raleigh had hoped, the prosecution 
suffers the harm of presenting a witness who exculpates the 
defendant and thereby damages the government’s case. 
Again, my general proposition is that the Confrontation 
Clause requires that at one point in the trial the defendant 
must have a face-to-face accusation (or repudiation of the 
charges) by the witness in open court and the defendant must 
have an opportunity to cross-examine that witness about the 
accusations.  I believe this understanding of the right has 
implications as well for the situation where the witness is 
unavailable and the confrontation right is satisfied by what 
occurred at a prior proceeding.  To be sufficient, what occurred 
at that prior proceeding must itself meet this model of both 
public accusation and cross-examination. 
In general, for prior testimony to be admissible the 
prosecution is first required to hold a hearing and call the 
accusing witness to testify.  The hearing should be satisfactory, 
even if held very early in the case, provided that it offers some 
potential benefit to the defendant, which motivates him to 
cross-examine the witness and places the basic question of guilt 
or innocence in some way at issue.  This is true even though it 
is not a mini-trial where guilt or innocence will be directly 
decided.  I believe a preliminary hearing or a motions hearing 
will suffice where lesser consequences are involved as long as 
the proceeding matters to both sides.  For instance, current law 
holds that preliminary hearings qualify even in jurisdictions 
where the consequence of a dismissal of charges for lack of 
probable cause is only the temporary freedom of incarcerated 
defendants.24 Thus, the prospect of eliminating conditions on 
the terms of release or other restrictions on the defendant’s 
movement, which are conditions that are generally applicable 
  
 24 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 302 at 288 & n.5, § 304 at 297 & n.8 
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). The United States Supreme Court approved use of 
prior testimony from a preliminary hearing in both California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 
(1970), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). No distinction is drawn in these cases 
between examinations at preliminary hearings satisfying the hearsay rule under prior 
testimony and the Confrontation Clause nor between jurisdictions where dismissal at 
the preliminary hearing simply affects the immediate liberty of the defendant (e.g., 
federal prosecutions) and those where dismissal may have broader implications for 
continued prosecution of the case (e.g., California). 
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in domestic violence cases, should be a sufficient incentive for 
the defendant. 
Although developed principally in the context of a 
hearsay rule rather than for Confrontation Clause purposes, I 
believe that the requirements associated with the prior 
testimony exception to the hearsay rule25 capture the essence of 
what should be sufficient, and frequently, what is required.  
There must be a prior hearing at which the witness is either 
called on direct examination by the prosecution or is 
voluntarily called as a witness by the defendant.  The 
defendant must have an opportunity to cross-examine,26 and if 
given a motive to do so, his failure to cross-examine for tactical 
or strategic reasons will not render the testimony 
constitutionally inadmissible.27 
In general, imperfections in the opportunity to cross-
examine arising from factors such as a lack of full discovery at 
an early stage in the proceeding should not be per se barriers to 
admissibility; rather, the test should be the overall adequacy of 
the opportunity.28  Perfection should not be required because 
the hearing is being held to satisfy a legitimate criminal justice 
purpose.  Thus, when later events cause the witness’ 
unavailability, reliance on a second-best method of meeting 
confrontation is justified. 
Legislative changes may be necessary to create such 
early adversarial hearings in domestic violence cases.  For 
example, many domestic violence cases involve only 
misdemeanor charges, for which preliminary hearings are not 
even authorized in most jurisdictions.  In some jurisdictions, 
the procedures at preliminary hearings may provide 
inadequate opportunity for cross-examination on issues going 
  
 25 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (requiring opportunity and similar motive to 
develop the testimony). 
 26 If the defendant voluntarily calls the witness, conducting direct and 
redirect and challenging the witness, and if the testimony is incriminating, the prior 
testimony exception to the hearsay rule is satisfied. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 
67-71 (1980) (ruling that the examination of the witness called by the defense attorney 
constituted an adequate opportunity to confront the witness even though she was never 
declared a hostile witness).  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (treating the opportunity to 
conduct direct and redirect as sufficient for admission of prior testimony). 
 27 See MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 304 at 298 (observing that as to prior 
testimony “judgments to limit or waive cross-examination at the earlier proceeding 
based on tactics or strategy, even though these judgments were apparently appropriate 
when made, do not undermine admissibility [if] the operative issue in the prior 
proceeding [was] basically similar and if the opportunity to cross-examine was 
available”). 
 28 See supra note 24. 
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to guilt or innocence, and therefore may render testimony from 
these hearings inadequate or problematic as an exception to 
Crawford.  For example, in People v. Frye,29 the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that restrictions on the scope of 
examination in that state rendered preliminary hearings 
inadequate to meet the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Further, the court declined to expand generally the 
allowable scope of cross-examination to rectify the inadequacy 
it perceived under the Confrontation Clause because doing so 
would have altered the nature of preliminary hearings across 
the system.30 Whether or not Frye’s ruling is correct regarding 
the adequacy of the state’s preliminary hearing under the 
United States Constitution, its broader point is sound.  
Changes may be necessary to ensure that early hearings 
provide adequate opportunity for cross-examination, and these 
changes will have other ramifications for trial proceedings.  
Specifically, in order to conserve judicial resources, legislatures 
may want to provide for preliminary hearings in misdemeanor 
cases, but do so only in domestic violence prosecutions.  
Further, they may want to grant broader rights of cross-
examination or discovery to ensure that challenges to the 
adequacy of the opportunity to cross-examine can be overcome. 
States may also want to prohibit the waiving of a 
probable cause hearing by the defendant,31 which I believe the 
states can do constitutionally.  As I argued earlier, I do not 
believe the rigorously enforced Confrontation Clause developed 
in Crawford as applied to testimonial statements is satisfied by 
simply giving the defendant an opportunity to call and examine 
the witness.  This is because the state, while offering the 
opportunity, ventures nothing and offers no benefit.  In this 
situation, the defendant is not faced with an accuser, but 
instead by either asking or not asking questions, he or she is 
forced to validate admission of even the most damning 
testimonial statements.  This is not constitutionally adequate. 
The situation where the defendant wants to avoid a 
hearing in which the witness’ testimony will be presented and 
cross-examination allowed, while exhibiting some superficial 
similarity to the defendant’s failure to call an available 
  
 29 92 P.3d 970, 981 (Colo. 2004). 
 30 Id. at 978. 
 31 See State v. Whitehead, 950 P.2d 818 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that 
under existing statutory and state constitutional provisions the prosecution could not 
prevent the defendant from waiving a preliminary hearing). 
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witness, is quite different.  If the prosecution is willing to call 
the witness and risk losing something of consequence, the 
defendant should not be able to avoid admission of prior 
statements by refusing to participate.  The prosecution should 
be able to call a witness to present her or his accusations in 
public and in the presence of the defendant and then stand 
available for challenge through cross-examination.  If the 
objective defendant would have a motive to secure favorable 
testimony from this witness, the confrontation right should be 
satisfied.  The defendant should not be able to avoid, by 
waiving the hearing for tactical or strategic reasons, a real 
opportunity to confront the accuser. 
As stated above, I believe that the prior proceeding 
must involve calling the witness for face-to-face accusation.  In 
cases where the testimony is a repudiation of the accusation, 
the resulting damage is the prosecution’s.  Importantly, this 
means that simply affording the defendant a chance to examine 
the witness in a deposition is not sufficient.  It also means 
other prior statements must be presented at the prior 
adversarial hearing so that the defendant has the opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness about them. 
Merely making the witness available for a deposition to 
be taken by the defendant should not satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause.32 This is little different than the situation Snowden 
properly rejected, where the witness was available but was not 
called as a witness by the state.33 It is not the responsibility of 
the defendant to make prior testimony admissible by securing 
  
 32 The intermediate courts of appeal in Florida are in conflict regarding 
whether discovery depositions satisfy the right of confrontation.  In Lopez v. State, the 
First District held that the opportunity to conduct a discovery deposition did not satisfy 
the confrontation right because of the inadmissibility of the deposition as substantive 
evidence under state law, the absence of the defendant’s right to be present, and the 
larger implications of a contrary holding to erase the confrontation right if the witness 
was available for a discovery deposition at any time before trial.  888 So. 2d 693, 700-02 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  By contrast, the Fifth District reached a different conclusion 
in Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling on rehearing 
motion). In that case, the defendant had taken the witness’ deposition, and the court 
treated it as sufficient to satisfy the confrontation right.  Id. at 801. 
 33 In Snowden, the state argued that the defendant waived his confrontation 
right because he did not call a declarant as a witness even though she was present in 
the courthouse, although she was not in the courtroom until released by the judge 
following the ruling on the admissibility of the hearsay statements.  867 A.2d 314, 330-
31 (Md. 2005).  The court rejected the argument.  Id. at 332-33.  This situation is thus 
functionally indistinguishable from the argument that if the defendant could have 
called a witness for a deposition but does not do so, he or she waives the confrontation 
right when the witness’ prior statement is presented at trial without that witness 
taking the stand. 
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cross-examination.  Rather, it is the responsibility of the 
government to ensure that the witness confronts the defendant 
with his or her accusations; then it becomes the defendant’s 
responsibility to cross-examine the accuser or face a ruling that 
the defendant’s right has been satisfied by the opportunity, 
even if he or she failed to take advantage of it.   
Conversely, a deposition to preserve testimony may 
qualify in some situations.  In this scenario, the prosecution 
calls the witness on direct examination, and the defendant is 
allowed fully to cross-examine on all issues relevant to guilt or 
innocence.  The resulting testimony may be admitted by either 
side if the witness becomes unavailable.34 In addition to the 
obvious potential benefits for the prosecution, this type of 
deposition may have negative consequences and commensurate 
benefits to the defendant if the witness’ testimony is 
exculpatory.  Finally, since it entails calling the witness to 
make his or her accusation in public, it satisfies the 
Confrontation Clause. 
However, this type of deposition is of more limited 
utility than an early preliminary hearing because such 
depositions should not be authorized unless there is a concrete 
justification for believing that the witness’ testimony must be 
preserved at an early time.35  Cross-examination opportunities 
for the defendant should not be routinely diminished.  
Accordingly, it is hard to justify a very early examination when 
defense counsel is not adequately prepared or has not received 
full discovery.  Why should such a clearly inferior opportunity 
to cross-examine be imposed on the defendant without a 
triggering emergency? If it can be, I argue that the prosecution 
must be required to conduct another deposition if the witness 
remains available once discovery has been completed and the 
defense counsel has prepared for trial.  Thus, although this sort 
of deposition is a potential vehicle for recording and admitting 
prior testimony, it is not likely to be generally available.  Even 
  
 34 Lopez suggests a different ruling for depositions designed to perpetuate 
testimony admissible at trial.  888 So. 2d at 700 (citing State v. Basiliere, 353 So. 2d 
820 (Fla. 1977)). 
 35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) allows such a deposition after indictment, but only 
in extraordinary circumstances and with some procedural protections.  These 
requirements do not necessarily relate to any constitutional concern, but they do tend 
to reduce the range of potential conflict with the Confrontation Clause. 
424 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
if constitutional, I suggest that broad use is contrary to sound 
public policy.36 
As noted above, I believe another restriction must be 
imposed on testimony received at these prior hearings.  Other 
prior statements of the witness must be offered in evidence at 
that hearing to satisfy Crawford through the principle of prior 
testimony and present unavailability.37  I argue that a prior 
statement, if it is testimonial under Crawford, must at some 
point meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause – 
either by what happened at the prior hearing coupled with 
present unavailability or by what happens at the present trial. 
As to statements that are not offered at the prior 
hearing by the prosecution, there is no accusation and likely no 
opportunity to cross-examine.  As to statements that are 
unknown at the time of the hearing, the failing is even clearer.  
In both situations, I contend the right has not been satisfied.  
Unlike the situation that exists when the witness is on the 
stand at the current trial where potentially all prior statements 
can be admitted, the mere fact that a witness has been cross-
examined previously about an incident does not render 
admissible all prior statements about that incident.  For such 
statements, an accusation has not been made and no 
  
 36 We have relatively little case law on the constitutionality of prior 
testimony given in situations where the witness testifies on direct examination and the 
defendant is allowed fully to cross-examine on issues relating to guilt or innocence, but 
the defendant’s only motive to examine is that the testimony will be admissible if the 
witness is unavailable at trial.  See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (1st 
Cir. 1979) (concluding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated where the trial 
judge, predicting correctly that the witness would claim the Fifth Amendment at trial, 
invited counsel for the co-defendants whom the witness had directly implicated to fully 
cross-examine him). But cf. United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 
1992) (ruling in somewhat similar context that FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) was not 
satisfied). 
  FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 may come into more frequent use as a way to deal with 
the separate concerns of foreign nationals who are incarcerated in the United States as 
material witnesses and who have an interest separate from the defendant to be 
deposed so that they may be released.  The government has an interest in making 
certain they are subject to cross-examination and that the hearing meets the 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause so their testimony may be admitted at trial if 
the witnesses are unavailable, as presumably many foreign nationals will be.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding exceptional 
circumstances to justify granting the request for a material witness deposition).  These 
procedures certainly operate on the premise that a defendant may be put in a position 
where he or she must cross-examine the witness brought to a deposition and examined 
by the government or lose the opportunity to confrontation and have the testimony 
admitted without cross-examination. 
 37 See, e.g., People v. Price, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 239 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding 
satisfaction of the Confrontation Clause where defendant exercised opportunity to 
cross-examine witness regarding prior statement). 
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opportunity to cross-examine has been afforded.  However, 
since the test here is providing the defendant with a 
meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, some minor 
changes in the facts that the witness testified to at the prior 
hearing, which may be contained in a hearsay statement by the 
witness, should be permitted if the right to cross-examine has 
been substantially afforded.38  
V. THE TROUBLING INCENTIVE FOR THE PROSECUTION TO 
ACCEPT THE WITNESS’ UNAVAILABILITY ONCE PRIOR 
CONFRONTED TESTIMONY HAS BEEN SECURED  
I worry that once prior confronted testimony of a 
witness has been secured, pressure that would otherwise be felt 
by the prosecution to secure the presence of that witness will 
be substantially diminished, and the effect will be a decreased 
effort to produce the witness for present testimony.  In Ohio v. 
Roberts,39 Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the 
government’s efforts to find the missing witness were 
inadequate and contended that far more would have been done 
had the state not satisfactorily obtained testimony from the 
preliminary hearing.40 One need not ascribe unethical motives 
to the prosecution: it is human nature that most people work 
harder when success is at stake and less hard when the 
materials for success have already been acquired.  Thus, if 
prior confronted testimony is more frequently recorded in 
domestic violence cases, it is safe to assume that the 
prosecution will work somewhat less hard to secure the 
presence of victims in those cases.  I have suggested that the 
defendant’s incentives may compensate in some situations to 
bring victims to court, but that possibility should not relieve 
the government of its obligation to demonstrate real 
  
 38 See People v. Ochoa, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 2004) (raising 
issues regarding statement not offered at prior hearing), review granted, 101 P.3d 478 
(Cal. 2004).  In Ochoa, the Court of Appeals found cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing adequate as to a prior statement that was not introduced at that 
hearing where the prior statement was brought to the defendant’s attention before the 
preliminary hearing and its contents appeared to overlap considerably with evidence 
offered at that hearing.  Without more detail than the opinion provides, it is difficult to 
determine whether this case is rightly decided at least as a matter of harmless error.  If 
not, I question whether the failure of the defense to cross-examine on a statement not 
offered by the prosecution should satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 
 39 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 40 Id. at 79-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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unavailability only after adequate efforts to locate and produce 
the witness. 
My point is that if we move in the direction of securing 
more prior confronted testimony, courts will need to be vigilant 
to ensure that the prosecution does indeed satisfy its 
constitutional obligation to show that the witness is 
unavailable.  I am not suggesting a draconian standard.  
Indeed, it is hard to articulate a specific standard to apply.  
However, courts should view the government’s claim in the way 
Justice Marshall suggested: Is the showing adequate in the 
sense that the government worked roughly as hard to find and 
produce the witness as it does in cases where the witness is 
needed to prove the prosecution’s case?41  Systemic reduction in 
effort should not be tolerated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the breadth of the definition of 
testimonial, Crawford will impact the ease with which 
prosecutors secure convictions.  Cases involving child sexual 
abuse and domestic violence are particularly susceptible to 
negative consequences because they often critically depend on 
hearsay to prove the case.  Domestic violence cases in 
particular rely on statements especially likely to be considered 
testimonial because they are given to government agents in a 
context that suggests to everyone involved that a criminal 
prosecution is likely to ensue. 
A broad negative impact on prosecution of these cases is 
not, however, inevitable.  More confrontation can be provided 
while prosecutions successfully continue.  This Comment is 
largely about the important ancillary doctrines that need to be 
developed to ensure that the confrontation that is provided in 
fact satisfies the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.  A 
public accusation is not simply an after-thought of the right; 
rather, both it and cross-examination are central components.  
Whether confrontation occurs in the present proceeding or a 
prior one, a public accusation is required at one point in the 
case.  When the witness is unavailable at trial and 
  
 41 Justice Marshall put my test in slightly different form. He argued that the 
prosecution would not have been so ineffectual and derelict in its efforts to secure the 
presence of the witness if it had not had her favorable preliminary hearing testimony 
to offer in her absence.  See id.  I suggest generalizing the test he would have applied in 
Roberts. 
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confrontation is satisfied by what occurred in the prior 
proceeding, the government must likewise present the accuser 
for the opportunity for cross-examination at that proceeding.  
The government must put something at risk, and the hearing 
must have consequences.  To claim the defendant has been 
confronted by providing an opportunity for cross-examination 
which will likely only harm the defendant by allowing 
otherwise inadmissible incriminating evidence to be admitted 
at trial is inadequate to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 
The range of issues left open by Crawford is enormous.  
It will take sustained effort to develop a full set of doctrines 
that both protect the defendant’s rights and facilitate justice.  I 
believe efforts like this excellent Symposium and, I hope, my 
Comment are steps in that direction. 
